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Re-evaluating the Privileges or
Immunities Clause
John C. Eastman*
Four years ago, in Saenz v. Roe,1 the United States Supreme
Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause2 to invalidate a California state law limiting welfare
benefits for newly arrived residents to the amount payable in the
state of the individual's prior residence. That the Court relied
upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause at all was something of
a surprise; that clause had been rendered virtually a dead letter-
"sapped... of any meaning," as Justice Clarence Thomas put it4-
a century and a quarter earlier in the Slaughter-House Cases.'
Even more of a surprise was that this revival of a long-dead con-
stitutional provision came from the pen of Justice John Paul Ste-
vens, widely regarded as one of the more vocal proponents of a
"living constitution,"6 rather than Justice Thomas, whose trade-
mark on the Court has been to revive the original understanding
of long overlooked or misinterpreted clauses of the Constitution.7
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law and Director, The Claremont
Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence; J.D., The University of Chicago Law
School; Ph.D., M.A., Claremont Graduate School. This article was prepared for Chapman
Law Review's Economic Liberties Symposium which took place on February 14, 2003.
1 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West 2001).
4 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
5 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
6 See, e.g., Dennis J. Horan et al., Two Ships Passing in the Night: An Interpretavist
Review of the White-Stevens Colloquy on Roe v. Wade, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 229
(1987). See also John Paul Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. MI.AMI L. REV. 277
(1986). But see Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme
Court's Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 836 (1997) (contending that Justice Stevens has
abandoned the "living constitution" model pushed by Justice Brennan and "replaced it with
a looser model of originalism . . . to combat the increasingly strict originalism espoused
most forcefully by Justice Thomas").
7 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2481 (2002) (Thomas, J., con-
curring); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852-53
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena , 515 U.S. 200, 240
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
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More surprising still, perhaps, was that Justice Thomas was
in dissent.' The Privileges or Immunities Clause is one of three or
four constitutional provisions that arguably were designed to cod-
ify the natural rights views of many of our nation's leading foun-
ders,9 and Justice Thomas is undoubtedly the most solid devotee
of the founders' natural rights philosophy to sit on the Court' °
since New Deal-era Justice George Sutherland." Indeed, some of
the most vigorous questioning during the initial phase of Justice
Thomas's confirmation hearing involved speeches the Justice had
made while chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, praising the natural rights principles of the founding
fathers.' 2 Yet rather than embracing Justice Stevens's revival of
the long-forgotten, natural rights-based clause, Justice Thomas
excoriated the majority for "attribut[ing] a meaning to the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause that likely was unintended when the
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and ratified." 3
Why was Justice Thomas in dissent? And why did Justice
Stevens apparently don the robes of originalism and breathe new
life into a long-forgotten provision of the Constitution rather than
simply rely on assertedly fundamental notions of fairness, ema-
nating from various penumbras of the Bill of Rights, 4 as the
Court had been doing for a generation? 5 The latter question is, I
think, pretty easy to answer.
s Saenz, 526 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 146
(2003); Trisha Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV. 347,416-25 (1995). Other provisions argua-
bly codifying natural rights principles include the Ninth Amendment and the Republican
Guarantee Clause. See, e.g., THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989); John C. Eastman, The
Declaration of Independence as Viewed From the States, in THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE: ORIGINS AND IMPACT 96 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 2002).
lo Justice Clarence Thomas was sworn into the Court on October 23, 1991.
1i See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLAR-
ENCE THOMAS (1999); John C. Eastman, Taking Justice Thomas Seriously, 2 GREEN BAG 2D
425, 426 (1999) (reviewing SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1999)); cf John C. Eastman & Harry V. Jaffa, Understanding Jus-
tice Sutherland as He Understood Himself, 63 U. CH. L. REV. 1347 (1996); HADLEY ARKES,
THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS
(1994).
12 See, e.g., First Session on the Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 2-5 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (first round of questioning by Sen.
Joseph R. Biden); Hearings, at 236-243 (questioning by Sen. Howell Heflin); Hearings, at
313-15 (questioning by Sen. Alan K. Simpson). See also Hearings, at 59-62 (opening state-
ment of Sen. Alan K. Simpson) (describing that some of Justice Thomas's opponents had
tried to portray him as "a promoter of wild, dramatic, and unchecked theories of natural
law that will cause the U.S. Constitution to come undone").
13 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 521.
14 U.S. CONsT. amends. I-X.
15 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
472 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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Existing Equal Protection jurisprudence treats non-suspect
classifications, such as that between recent and long-established
residents, very deferentially, subject to minimal rational basis re-
view by the courts.16 There is clearly a rational basis for a state
law designed not to provide an incentive for indigents to come to
the state merely to partake of welfare benefits more generous
than were available elsewhere in the country."' On the other
hand, under its existing "fundamental rights" jurisprudence,
whether derived from the Equal Protection' or Due Process 9
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, or more ephemerally from
the Ninth Amendment,20 the Court had never gone so far as to
hold that individuals have a "fundamental right" to particular
levels of welfare benefits.2' Such a holding would have opened up
a Pandora's box that apparently gave pause even to Justice
Stevens.22
The former question is much more difficult, but in the end
much more important. Justice Thomas did not bemoan the revi-
val of the Privileges or Immunities Clause; indeed, he welcomed
it. Noting his belief that "the demise of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause has contributed in no small part to the current disar-
ray of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence," he invited a re-
examination of the Clause, stating that he "would be open to
reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case."23 But his diffi-
culty with Justice Stevens's majority opinion was that it "fail[ed]
to address [the Clause's] historical underpinnings or its place in
But see Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 627 n.5 (1990) (plurality
opinion) ("The notion that the Constitution, through some penumbra emanating from the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause, establishes this Court as a
Platonic check upon the society's greedy adherence to its traditions can only be described as
imperious.").
16 See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296 (1979); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83
(1976). See also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291, 296 (1978); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
17 Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (upholding provision of Mary-
land's Federal Aid to Families With Dependent Children program establishing a maximum
benefit level regardless of family size, noting that the regulation "provides an incentive to
seek gainful employment").
is See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
19 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
22 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 515 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that
recent cases analyzing classifications of new and old residents applied a rational basis test
under the Equal Protection Clause, not heightened scrutiny of a right to travel under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause).
23 Id. at 527-28.
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our constitutional jurisprudence."24 Instead, he claimed that any
proper reevaluation should "consider whether the Clause should
displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal protection
and substantive due process jurisprudence."25 No wonder he and
Justice Stevens were on opposite sides in Saenz!
We are, of course, not without materials with which to begin
the reevaluation project invited by Justice Thomas. If the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases are to be overruled as flatly inconsistent with the
original understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, we
have an opposing contemporaneous opinion to consider-the dis-
senting opinion by Justice Stephen Field in Slaughter-House it-
self.26 At issue in the Slaughter-House Cases was a Louisiana law
that essentially granted a monopoly over all butchering in the
City of New Orleans to a politically well-connected butcher com-
pany." The law was challenged as a violation of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and for the
first time since that Amendment's enactment, the Court had to
decide just what rights were protected by that clause.2"
The phrase, "privileges or immunities," is of course drawn
from the nearly identical "privileges and immunities" Clause in
Article IV of the Constitution.29 The general understanding at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, as at the time
of the ratification of the Constitution itself, was that the phrase,
"privileges or immunities," was meant to protect the fundamental
natural rights that every legitimate government was bound to re-
spect, including the freedom of contract-specifically, the common
law right to earn a living at a lawful occupation, free from unrea-
sonable governmental interference °.3  This right was central to the
Jeffersonian tradition of individual liberty and lay at the core of
the "pursuit of happiness" about which Jefferson wrote so elo-
quently in the Declaration of Independence. 1 Jefferson was here
24 Id. at 527.
25 Id. at 528.
26 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-111 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 59-60. Other butchers remained free to continue their own butchering activi-
ties, but they had to do so in the monopoly's own slaughterhouse and pay for the privilege.
Id.
28 Id. at 66-67.
29 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Contrary to the position taken by some scholars, I do
not subscribe to the view that the difference between the "Privileges and Immunities"
clause of Article IV and the "Privileges or Immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has any interpretive significance. The latter formulation is simply the result of the
different grammatical sentence structure in which the clause appears.
30 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (describing the freedom "to
contract [and] to engage in any of the common occupations of life" as among "those privi-
leges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men")
(emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., W. Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 804 (Colo.
1966) (Frantz, J., dissenting) ('Freedom of contract'.., is also safeguarded by the constitu-
tions of the states, and, by a constitutional guaranty of pursuit of happiness."); Gen. Elec.
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following John Locke, who argued that "every Man has a Property
in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.
The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say,
are properly his."32 The government had no right to interfere with
that liberty except to protect the public safety, via necessary
health and safety regulations.
Jefferson was not alone in following this Lockean natural
rights notion. One of the most influential of the early State consti-
tutional enactments was the Virginia Declaration of Rights,33
drafted by George Mason and adopted by the Virginia Constitu-
tional Convention on June 12, 1776. Section 1 of the Virginia Dec-
laration of Rights provided:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest
their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety. 4
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1780, simi-
larly recognized that the right of "acquiring" property as a means
of seeking happiness was one of the "unalienable" rights with
which all human beings are born: "All men are born free and
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights;
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending
their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protect-
ing property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness."35 New Hampshire included a similar provision in a
Declaration of Rights when it replaced its original, pre-Declara-
tion constitution with new constitutions in 1784 and 1792: "All
men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights; among
which are-the enjoying and defending life and liberty-acquir-
ing, possessing and protecting property-and in a word, of seeking
and obtaining happiness. "36
All of the above provisions, and others like them, laid the nat-
ural rights foundation that I contend was ultimately codified in
the constitutional language of privileges and immunities, 37 and
Co. v. Am. Buyers Coop., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354, 361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958) ("'[Flreedom of
contract'.. . is safeguarded by the constitutional guaranty of 'pursuit of happiness' ..... ).
See also Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract The-
ory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 90-92 (1998).
32 JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-06 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1967) (1690).
33 VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights.
34 Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
35 MAss. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. I (emphasis added).
36 N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. II (emphasis added). See also N.H. CONST. of 1792,
pt. I, art. II.
37 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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even in the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of govern-
ment.38 Because human beings are created equally free and inde-
pendent, they have-inherent in their nature and endowed by
their Creator-the fundamental, inalienable right to protect that
free and independent nature, or, in other words, the right to life
and to liberty, and the right to acquire property in things that are
the fruit of their own free and independent labor and to otherwise
pursue their own individual happiness.3 9 These are the rights-
that is to say, the "privileges" and "immunities"-that every legiti-
mate government is bound to recognize and without which the
government cannot rightly be said to be "republican" in form.4 ° In-
deed, in the Jeffersonian formulation, the sole purpose of govern-
ment is to protect these unalienable rights.4'
In other words, the provisions of Article IV (and later of the
Fourteenth Amendment) guaranteeing the "privileges and immu-
nities" of citizenship and a "republican" form of government sim-
ply cannot be understood apart from the natural law principles of
the Declaration from which they were drawn. Although the courts
have either explicitly or effectively treated these provisions as
nonjusticiable,42 they are clearly commands of the positive law,
and not just some vague, philosopher's ideal of higher justice, such
as is recognized in the Ninth Amendment of the United States
Constitution4 3 and parallel state constitutional provisions.4
38 Id. § 4.
39 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
4o At first blush, the guaranty of a "republican" form of government might be thought
merely to protect the form of governmental institutions-governing bodies consisting of
representatives chosen by the people. See, e.g., Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).
But the guaranty must have a substantive component as well; a government chosen by only
a favored class (such as whites in the ante-bellum South), or which did not have protections
for the rights of the minority, is not "republican" in form. As Abraham Lincoln famously
described, legitimate republican government must be "of the people, by the people, for the
people." Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (emphasis added), re-
printed in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
41 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure [the
unalienable Rights with which all men are endowed by their Creator], Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.").
42 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 n.17 (1980) ("We do not
reach the merits of the appellants' argument that the Act violates the Guaranty Clause,
art. IV, § 4, since that issue is not justiciable."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-10 (1962);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (How.) 1, 42 (1849) (holding that a dispute over the Rhode Island
elections and the status of the resulting state government vis-A-vis the Guaranty Clause of
art. IV, § 4, was not a political question for Congress or a justiciable issue for the Court to
decide).
43 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
44 For a criticism of the idea that unenumerated natural rights, such as those recog-
nized by the Ninth Amendment, are unenforceable, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 44 (1990). See also The Nomination of
Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong, 1st Sess. 249 (1989):
I do not think you can use the ninth amendment unless you know something of
what it means. For example, if you had an amendment that says "Congress shall
make no" and then there is an ink blot and you cannot read the rest of it and that
128 [Vol. 6:123
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While history has not been kind to this interpretation of ei-
ther constitutional clause, the historical development of the Re-
publican Guaranty Clause45 and the notion of fundamental rights
codified in the Privileges and Immunities Clause demonstrates, or
at least strongly suggests, that these specific textual provisions of
the Constitution were themselves designed to codify the principles
of the Declaration and make them enforceable as positive law. A
review of that history is therefore in order.46
In 1783, after years of wrangling over the disposition of the
western lands, Virginia ceded to the United States her claims to
all land northwest of the Ohio River, a tract of land that would
eventually become the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
and Wisconsin.47 The terms of the Virginia Act of Cession, which
were scrupulously followed by Congress in the years to come, in-
cluded this provision: "that the states so formed, shall be distinct
republican states, and admitted members of the federal union;
having the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence,
as the other states."48 The two ideas codified in this Act of Cession
are extremely important in the historical development of the
United States as one nation composed of free and equal states,
rather than a nation composed of original states and a collection of
colonial territories. The first would find its way into the United
States Constitution of 1787, as the Republican Guaranty Clause of
Article IV, Section 4.49 The second would come to be known as the
Equal Footing Doctrine,50 pursuant to which every new state
would be admitted to the Union on an "equal footing" with the
original states.5'
More importantly for present purposes, the two doctrines ex-
pressed in the Virginia Act of Cession shed a great deal of light on
the role the Declaration of Independence and its principles were
intended to play in the expansion of the American regime to new
territories in the West.52 The constitutional guaranty of a republi-
can form of government, it was soon to be argued by those opposed
to slavery, required Congress to deny admission to states that per-
is the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be
under the ink blot if you cannot read it.
Id.; Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional
Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 93, 94 (1995).
45 U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
46 For a more comprehensive discussion of the argument presented here, see East-
man, supra note 9, at 96-117.
47 Virginia Act of Cession, in 26 JouRNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS:
1774-1789, at 115-16 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928) [hereinafter Virginia Act of Cession].
48 Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
49 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4.
50 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228-29 (1845).
51 Id. at 229. See also United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 6 (1997).
52 Virginia Act of Cession, supra note 47, at 114; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(U.S. 1776).
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mitted slavery, while those in favor of slavery argued that the
Equal Footing Doctrine guaranteed to each new state the same
constitutional protections of slavery as the original states en-
joyed. 53 The actions taken by Congress with respect to the North-
west Territory clearly demonstrate that the former argument was
more consistent with the thinking of the founders, but the latter
argument would eventually prevail, placing the nation on the
tragic road that culminated in the Civil War.
The Supreme Court has noted that the "distinguishing fea-
ture" of a republican form of government "is the right of the people
to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and
pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in
representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be
those of the people themselves."54 In other words, in an extended
territory, republican government is the means by which the Decla-
ration's principle of consent by the governed is implemented. And
because the principle of consent is mandated by the self-evidence
of the proposition that all men are created equal, the constitu-
tional guaranty of a republican form of government is analytically
incompatible with the existence of slavery. As James Madison,
himself a slave-owner, wrote on the eve of the federal constitu-
tional convention of 1787, "where slavery exists, the Republican
Theory becomes still more fallacious."55
This conclusion, logically compelled by the nature of the mat-
ter, was given effect in the Northwest Ordinance, the ordinance
adopted by the Continental Congress on July 13, 1787, "for the
Government of the Territory of the United States north-west of
the river Ohio" or, in other words, for the territory that had been
ceded to the United States by Virginia in 1783.6 Article VI of that
Ordinance provided: "There shall be neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment
of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.. ,.
The preamble to the Ordinance makes clear that the prohibi-
tion on slavery was not adopted simply because, as some histori-
ans would later argue, the soil and climate of the region would not
support a slave economy. On the contrary, the preamble demon-
strates that the anti-slavery provision was mandated by the prin-
ciples upon which the nation and existing states had been
founded, namely, the principles of the Declaration of
Independence:
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; Pollard, 44 U.S. at 228-29.
54 Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).
55 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 144
(W.W. Norton & Co., 1987) (1840).
56 An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the river Ohio,
ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.a (July 13, 1787) (re-enacted Aug. 7, 1789).
57 Id. at 51-53 n.a.
130 [Vol. 6:123
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And for extending the fundamental principles of civil and relig-
ious liberty, which form the basis whereon these republics [i.e.,
the existing states], their laws and constitutions are erected; to
fix and establish those principles as the basis of all laws, consti-
tutions, and governments, which forever hereafter shall be
formed in the said territory: to provide also for the establish-
ment of States, and permanent government therein, and for
their admission to a share in the federal councils on an equal
footing with the original States, at as early periods as may be
consistent with the general interest:
It is hereby ordained and declared, by the authority afore-
said, That the following articles shall be considered as articles
of compact between the original States, and the people and
States in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, un-
less by common consent .... 58
In other words, the anti-slavery article, like the other of the Ordi-
nance's six articles, was to be considered an "article of compact"
that was unalterable unless by the common consent of the original
states and the people and states in the new territory, because it
was mandated by "the fundamental principles of civil and relig-
ious liberty" upon which the existing states were founded and
which were to serve as the foundation of government in the new
states as well.59
The language of the preamble also gives life to the later claim
that the Equal Footing Doctrine guaranteed to new states the
same right to permit slavery as existed in the original states."
The new states to be formed in the Northwest Territory were ex-
pressly guaranteed the right to enter the union on an "equal foot-
ing" with the original states, but the prohibition on slavery was to
remain an unalterable principle, established as the basis for "all
laws, constitutions, and governments" that would thereafter be
formed in the territory. s
While the hyper-technical argument might be (and eventually
was) advanced that the prohibition applied only to all territorial
governments, as opposed to governments formed after admission
to statehood, the word "constitutions" undermines that conten-
tion. Because the territories were governed by act of Congress un-
til admission to statehood, they did not have separate
constitutions;62 thus, the word "constitutions" must necessarily
have been intended to apply to the constitutions of state govern-
ments even after admission to the Union.
58 Id. at 51-52 n.a (first and second emphasis added).
59 Id. (emphasis added).
60 Id. at 51-53 n.a.
61 Id. at 51-52 n.a.
62 Id. at 51-53 n.a.
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Moreover, when the eastern portion of the territory petitioned
for statehood in 1802, Congress mandated in the Ohio Enabling
Act both that the new state "shall be admitted into the Union,
upon the same footing with the original states, in all respects
whatever" and that the new state's constitution and government
"shall be republican, and not repugnant to the ordinance of the
thirteenth of July, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven,
between the original states and the people and states of the terri-
tory northwest of the river Ohio."63
The people of Ohio (and subsequently the people of each of the
other Northwest Territory states) complied with that mandate by
incorporating into Article VIII, Section 2 of their new constitution
the requirement that "[t] here shall be neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude in this State, otherwise than for the punishment of
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."64 This
provision was necessary, according to the Ohio constitution, in or-
der "[that the general, great, and essential principles of liberty
and free government may be recognized, and forever unalterably
established."65 Section 1 of the same article contained the litany of
principles drawn from the Declaration of Independence: the equal-
ity of all men; the doctrine of inalienable rights, including the
rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness; the
requirement of consent; and the right to alter or abolish govern-
ments when necessary to affect the legitimate ends of govern-
ment.66 Moreover, Section 1 expressly tied these principles to the
idea of "republican" government:
That all men are born equally free and independent, and have
certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights, amongst
which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety; and every free republican government be-
ing founded on their sole authority, and organized for the great
purpose of protecting their rights and liberties and securing
their independence; to effect these ends, they have at all times a
complete power to alter, reform, or abolish their government,
whenever they may deem it necessary.s7
63 An Act to Enable the People of the Eastern Division of the Territory Northwest of
the River Ohio, to Form a Constitution and State Government, and for the Admission of
Such State into the Union, on an Equal Footing with the Original States, and for Other
Purposes, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173-74 (Apr. 30, 1802). Congress imposed the same terms on each
of the other states that were admitted to the Union from the Northwest Territory: Indiana
in 1816, Illinois in 1818, and Michigan in 1837. An Act to Provide for the Government of
the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51-53 n.a (July 13, 1787) (re-
enacted Aug. 7, 1789).
64 OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 2.
65 Id. art. VIII.
66 Id. § 1.
67 Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
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Equal footing, then, did not allow new states to avail themselves
of the slavery compromises in the Constitution at the expense of
the republican principle. Those compromises were to be cabined
to the original states.
This conclusion is actually compelled not just by the theory of
the Declaration, but by the explicit terms of both the Northwest
Ordinance and the Constitution itself. The Northwest Ordi-
nance's anti-slavery article, Article VI, contains a proviso clause,
elided over above: "Provided always, that any person escaping into
the same, from whom labour or service is lawfully claimed in any
one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed,
and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labour or service as
aforesaid."68
As the emphasized words make clear, the obligation to return
fugitive slaves expressly extended only to slaves escaping from the
"original states." Article I, Section 9 of the United States Consti-
tution contains a similar limitation: "The Migration or Importa-
tion of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to
the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight.... " 69 Thus, the
Northwest Ordinance was a large step toward full vindication of
the Declaration's principles. Moreover, the fact that the anti-slav-
ery provisions were deemed in that document to be required by
the principles upon which the nation was founded and also man-
dated by the requirement of republican government mandated by
the Virginia Act of Cession bolsters the contention that those prin-
ciples were themselves codified as positive law in the United
States Constitution's Republican Guaranty Clause.7 °
The drafters of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment71 likewise referred to the fundamental
principles of the American founding when drafting the amend-
ment, 2 and also to the important case of Corfield v. Coryell.7 3 In
that case, Justice Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, held that
68 An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio,
ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51-53 n.a (July 13, 1787) (re-enacted Aug. 7, 1789) (emphasis added).
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The Constitution's own "fugitive
slave" clause is not textually limited to the original states, but the greater power to exclude
slaves from new states altogether would render such a protection unnecessary. Id. art. IV,
§ 2, cl. 3.
70 Id. § 4.
71 Portions of this section are drawn from John C. Eastman and Timothy Sandefur,
Stephen Field: Frontier Justice or Justice on the Natural Rights Frontier?, 6 NEXUS 121
(2001) (reprinted with permission).
72 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-65 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 86 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham);
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
73 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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the rights secured by the parallel Privileges and Immunities
Clause in Article IV of the Constitution included "the enjoyment of
life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety. '7 The
term "privileges and immunities" had long been used to describe
these rights.75
The majority in the Slaughter-House Cases rejected this his-
torical understanding of the clause and instead held that the
clause merely protected a few rights of national, as opposed to
state, citizenship, and therefore did not protect the old common
law right to earn a living free from undue governmental bur-
dens.76 By its holding, the majority effectively defined the
clause-which embodied the natural rights philosophy of the Dec-
laration of Independence-into obscurity.
Justice Field, in a powerful (and correct) dissent, would have
given the clause its due: "[By the first clause], [tihe fundamental
rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to [citizens] as a
free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the
United States .... [The amendment] assumes that there are such
privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as such
.... "7' Then, adopting Justice Washington's definition of the par-
allel phrase in Article IV as his own, Justice Field elaborated on
the definition: Privileges or Immunities are rights "which belong
* . . to the citizens of all free governments," which are, "in their
nature, fundamental.""s In other words, for both Justice Washing-
ton with respect to the Article IV clause (applicable to the federal
government), and Justice Field with respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment clause (applicable to the states), the natural law prin-
ciples of the Declaration of Independence had been brought down
from the heavens and made into positive law, enforceable by the
courts. Indeed, Justice Field wrote that the Fourteenth
Amendment
was intended to give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of
inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator;
which the law does not confer, but only recognizes. If the trader
in London could plead that he was a free citizen of that city
against the enforcement to his injury of monopolies, surely
under the 14th Amendment every citizen of the United States
should be able to plead his citizenship of the Republic as a pro-
74 Id. at 551-52.
75 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining the history of the terms); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125-29.
76 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872).
77 Id. at 95-96 (Field, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting).
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tection against any similar invasion of his privileges and
immunities.79
Justice Field's view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is
most assuredly not the view adopted by Justice Stevens's majority
opinion in Saenz. Indeed, the view that one has a constitutional
"right" to governmental benefits,8" which is to say benefits paid
from the tax revenues contributed by others, is fundamentally at
odds with the natural rights principles that the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause was designed to protect. Instead, Justice Ste-
vens's view is more in line with the views of the Progressives at
the end of the nineteenth century, who viewed the Declaration of
Independence and the natural law tradition with ultimate skepti-
cism, if not outright hostility.81
As noted, Justice Field relied upon Justice Bushrod Washing-
ton's landmark ruling in Corfield to flush out the meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.82
But in Corfield, Justice Washington actually held that the right to
travel to another state in order to fish for oysters in its lakes was
not a privilege protected by the clause.83 In other words, the right
did not include a claim to someone else's property, but it did in-
clude, as Justice Field would later argue, the right to acquire your
own property by pursuing lawful employment in a lawful man-
ner.' Had Justice Stevens bothered to consider the actual mean-
ing of the clause, he would have realized that newly-arrived
citizens from other states no more have a natural right-a privi-
lege and immunity-to the common fund of welfare benefits pro-
vided by the earnings of California's laborers than the plaintiff in
79 Id. at 105-06 (Field, J., dissenting). See also Kimberly C. Shankman and Roger
Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance Among States,
Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TFx. REV. L. & POL. 1, 11 (1998) (contending
that the privileges or immunities clause "was intended essentially to constitutionalize the
natural rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence"). Of course, some contempo-
rary positive law jurists, such as Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Antonin
Scalia, and former Judge Robert Bork, reject the claim that the natural rights principles of
the Declaration are enforceable by the courts. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Consti-
tution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 705 (1976); BORK, supra note 44. However, in refusing to give
the two privileges and immunities clauses their intended natural rights meaning, these
jurists are actually rejecting the positive law mooring for natural rights intended by the
framers of the clauses. For sources providing a more comprehensive treatment of this dis-
pute, see John C. Eastman and Harry V. Jaffa, supra note 11, at 1355 n.23.
so See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Under the Bridges of Paris: Economic Liberties
Should Not Be Just for the Rich, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 31 (2003).
81 For a more complete discussion of the Progressive Era's hostility to natural law, see
Thomas G. West, The Constitutionalism of the Founders Versus Modern Liberalism, 6
NEXUS 75 (2001).
82 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
83 Id. at 551-52.
s4 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 109-11 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
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Corfield had a natural right to the oyster beds held in common by
the people of New Jersey.
Justice Stevens has opened the door for a renewed Privileges
or Immunities Clause jurisprudence, however, and that door is
likely to stay open. In what direction that open door leads re-
mains to be seen. It could be a Justice Stevens direction, pointing
the way to a new round of "rights" to entitlements of every sort, or
it could be in Justice Field's and Justice Thomas's direction, to-
wards understanding both the scope and the limits of a Privileges
or Immunities Clause grounded in natural rights. Unless Justice
Field's understanding can be recovered, the Supreme Court will
be doomed to repeat in this century, via the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause, the errors of the post-New Deal substantive due pro-
cess revolution of the last century.
Unfortunately, the prospects for recovering Justice Field's un-
derstanding are not particularly good. Many conservatives have
what might be called a "Justice Brennan Problem." They are not
willing to give any credence to a natural rights jurisprudence,
even one grounded in the actual text of the Constitution such as
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, lest it become the departure
point for Justice Brennan's, or now Justice Stevens's, liberalism-
a liberalism that purports to be grounded in natural rights but
actually ignores the tenets of such rights.5 In rejecting natural
rights jurisprudence altogether, however, many conservatives
have rejected the very tools that would allow them to make the
kind of distinctions that Justice Field and Justice Washington
made. If people would make the effort to understand Justice
Field's judicial philosophy, perhaps the modern day juridical sup-
porters of limited government would regain the jurisprudential
high ground, and find in Justice Field a suitable source as they
embark upon the inquiry invited by Justice Thomas in his dissent-
ing opinion in Saenz v. Roe.
85 Judge Robert Bork, for example, praised the majority opinion in the Slaughter-
House Cases as "a narrow victory for judicial moderation." Bomb, supra note 44, at 39.
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